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VEIL OF IGNORANCE IN 
RAWLSIAN THEORY 
As part of his effort to answer the question "What is the 
best conception of justice for a democratic society?" 
philosopher John Rawls constructed a thought experi-
ment called the original position. In the original posi-
tion, representatives of members of society choose 
principles of justice for society in light of limited inter-
ests and with limited information. Situated behind the 
veil of ignorance, the parties in the original position 
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have no knowledge about particular facts that could 
lead them to prefer principles of justice partial to those 
they represent. The veil of ignorance is thus an impor-
tant part of Rawls's argument that his conception of 
justice-justice as fairness-is the best conception for a 
democratic society. 
The Original Position 
Taking a closer look at the terms of Rawls's question 
provides a number of clues to its answer. From a closer 
look at the idea of justice, we get ideas of the role, sub-
ject, circumstances, and formal constraints of justice. 
From a closer look at the idea of a democratic society, 
we get the ideas of social cooperation between free and 
equal citizens, reciprocity, and fairness. The best concep-
tion of justice for a democratic society is the conception 
of justice that best satisfies and expresses these many 
ideas. 
Different conceptions of justice do better at satisfying 
different ideas; some better satisfy the formal constraints 
of justice-generality, publicity, and stability-while 
others do better at capturing the notions of fairness, 
reciprocity, and equality. How can we find a way to 
rank candidate conceptions of justice that allows us to 
say that one of these does better than the rest at satisfy-
ing and expressing these ideas? 
Rawls's answer to the problem of how to rank con-
ceptions of justice is the original position. The original 
position is constructed to turn the scatter of ideas 
about justice for a democratic society into a device that 
ranks conceptions of justice according to how well they 
satisfy and express them. In this manner, the original 
position models what we generally believe and hope 
for when we think about justice for a democratic 
society-in other words, our normative beliefs on this 
subject. 
The original position is inspired by the social con-
tract tradition. In this tradition, the legitimacy and 
obligating power of political authority stems from the 
wills of those who are subjected to it as their will either 
was or could be expressed in a social contract. The 
social contract tradition draws on two powerful 
strands in Western moral philosophy: first, the princi-
ple that no person has natural authority over another 
person and that interpersonal coercion, therefore, is 
permissible only when exercised according to reasons 
acceptable to the coerced; second, that consent and 
promises carry obligation: if I voluntarily consent to 
some agreement, then this consent creates new rights 
and obligations. If we bring these two ideas together, 
we get the idea that all political authority must be gen-
erated by the acts of those party to the authority 
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relation-in short, by people coming together in a 
social contract in which they agree to create and 
respect political authority that legislates and enforces 
laws on behalf of all. 
Rawls draws on the social contract tradition, but 
the ranking of principles of justice that issue from the 
original position is not a social contract. The original 
position is a thought experiment that helps us think 
clearly about what justice requires. The hypothetical 
agreement of the original position is not the source of 
political authority or political obligation-it does not 
produce laws and institutions or any agreement to 
obey laws and institutions. Instead, Rawls's contractu-
alism is found in his endorsement of the liberal prin-
ciple of legitimacy, which says that the exercise of 
political authority must take place in accordance with 
principles that all those subjected to it could agree to 
in a situation that respects their status as free and equal 
moral persons. The original position helps us identify 
what these principles are and shows what we can agree 
to as free and equal moral persons. The aim of the 
original position is to answer the question: What is the 
best conception of justice for a democratic society? It 
does so by modeling what we already believe about 
justice and democratic society. The original position is 
not meant to introduce any additional materials into 
the argument but to take the materials we already have 
at hand and use them to construct a way to make clear 
what they imply. In a sense, the original position is 
simply a device that helps us think through our com-
mitments and considered convictions about demo-
cratic society and be clear about what we already 
believe. 
. In the_ tho~ght experiment that is the original posi-
tion, we 1magme that representatives of all members of 
s?ciety come together and choose a conception of jus-
tice that those they represent will live by. The parties 
are given a list of candidate conceptions and rank them 
by running a pairwise comparison-A is better than B 
but C is better than A, and so on-until they hav; 
a_rrived ~t a_ de~inite order. The highest-ranking concep-
tion of Justice ts the best one for a democratic society. 
The original position, accordingly, plays an epistemic 
role in Rawls 's argument for principles of justice: it 
helps us think about what justice requires. Further, the 
force of the original position argument is a function of 
the force of the assumptions that go into it. If Rawls 
has identified the right ideas about justice for a demo-
cratic society, and if these ideas are well expressed in 
the original position, and if the parties would prefer 
justice as fairness to any other candidate conception of 
justice, then we can confidently say that justice as fair-
ness is the best conception of justice for a democratic 
society. 
The Veil of Ignorance 
The original position models our beliefs about justice 
for a democratic society by defining the knowledge and 
interests of the parties and by requiring that all candi-
date conceptions of justice satisfy the formal constraints 
of the concept of right. The veil of ignorance defines the 
knowledge of the parties; it shields them from knowl-
edge of particular facts that they could use to favor 
particular members of society while at the same time 
allowing them knowledge of general facts that are help-
ful for thinking about justice in general. The veil of 
ignorance thus expresses a commitment to a sort of 
imparti ality that is needed to ensure that the principles 
we select express our commitments to fairness and 
equal citizenship. To ensure this impartiality, the veil of 
ignorance shields the parties from knowledge about the 
people they represent: about their gender, race, religious 
beliefs, wealth, and similar facts. The parties are also 
ignorant of particular facts about the society those they 
represent live in, such as how religious beliefs are dis-
tributed, what natural resources their society has access 
to, and the distribution of wealth and opportunities. 
While the veil of ignorance shields the parties from 
knowledge that could lead them to propose unfair terms 
of social cooperation, it lets them know enough about 
the general conditions of democratic societies to rank 
candidate conceptions of justice. So the parties know 
that those they represent have a conception of the good 
(but not what it is); they know general facts about 
human needs and psychology; that they are in circum-
stances of justice (where social cooperation is both 
necessary and possible); they know theories of sociol-
ogy and economics and that their society contains a 
plurality of philosophical, religious, political, and social 
doctrines. 
That the veil of ignorance leaves the parties without 
any knowledge about the interests of those they repre-
~en~ or even about the distribution of interests in society 
mv~tes. the question of how they can rank conceptions 
of Justice-for what interests do they have that could 
lead them to have preferences between different candi-
date conceptions? 
Interests of the Parties: Primary Goods 
Rawls's answer is that the parties know that those they 
represent have some conception of the good, that cir-
cumstances of justice are present, and what the general 
needs of human beings are. In light of this knowledge 
the parties will try to procure for those they represen; 
certain all-purpose means that are generally needed 
by members of a democratic society. Rawls calls these 
all-purpose means primary goods. 
The primary goods serve three general interests of 
democratic citizens: first, their interest in developing 
their capacity for a conception of the good (their first 
moral power); second, their interest in developing their 
capacity for a sense of justice (their second moral 
power); and, third, their interest in having adequate all-
purpose means for pursuing their conception of the 
good-no matter what it is. This account of the three 
basic interests of democratic citizenship supports the 
following list of primary goods: 
1. Basic rights and liberties 
2. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation 
3. Power and prerogatives and opportunities for access 
to positions and offices 
4. Income and wealth 
5. The social bases of self-respect 
The parties are interested in securing for those they 
represent basic rights and liberties necessary for the 
development of their moral powers; opportunities for 
access to offices and positions; and as large a share of 
income and wealth as they can get. 
Note that the parties are "mutually disinterested": 
they care only to maximize the position of those they 
represent without regard for the position of others. This 
mutual disinterestedness expresses their equal claim to 
the fruits of cooperation and a rejection of envy as indi-
cator of injustice. The fact that others have more than 
oneself is not a reason to suspect injustice in the 
system-what matters is whether the distribution 
wherein they have more (or less) arose from fair coop-
eration. If the system of rules (the basic structure) is just, 
then the fact that others have more than oneself offers 
no reason for complaint. 
The parties also are interested in choosing a con-
ception of justice that can be stable, meaning that it 
generates its own support over time. If, for example, a 
conception of justice tends to create distrust or resent-
ment among citizens, this undermines its ability to sup-
port a stable system of institutions-in effect, making it 
harder to have a society that is ordered by this concep-
tion of justice-and this then counts as a reason against 
this conception. 
The Limited 
Usefulness of the Veil of Ignorance 
There is no actual situation like the original position. 
The original position is not some legislative assembly 
that might happen or could have happened. The veil of 
Veil of Ignorance in Rawlsian Theory 891 
ignorance is not something that we could create in the 
real world (and even if we could, it is not clear why we 
would do it). Again, the original position is a thought 
experiment with imaginary characters that think about 
justice using only knowledge and interests relevant for 
the question-this could not happen. It is better to think 
of the original position as a device that sorts concep-
tions of justice according to how well they fit the basic 
ideas of democratic society and democratic citizenship 
than as a bargaining situation in which parties negotiate 
for principles. 
That the original position and the veil of ignorance 
it employs are hypothetical, imaginary, and impossible 
is not an objection to it. If it truly expresses the funda-
mental normative commitments of democratic society 
and helps us sort candidate conceptions of justice 
according to how well they satisfy these commitments, 
then it is useful for thinking clearly about justice for a 
democratic society. 
Since the veil of ignorance models ideas about justice 
and not a particular view of human nature or human 
psychology, it is supposed to stand free of commitments 
to any particular metaphysics of personhood-for 
example, that people were or were not created by 
God-and particular theories of personal or collective 
psychology. Instead, the view of the person that informs 
the original position and the veil of ignorance is norma-
tive: the veil of ignorance is constructed from ideals of 
democratic citizenship and democratic society. These 
ideals do, of course, suppose certain facts about human 
nature, human society, and human psychology-that we 
have needs, that we are modestly rational, that we are 
social creatures, that we are in circumstances of justice 
and thus can cooperate with others on fair terms-but 
the original position and the veil of ignorance are not 
directly modeling these assumptions. Instead, the veil of 
ignorance models only the point of view relevant for 
thinking about justice for a democratic society, and the 
intent, at least, is that this can be done without assum-
ing any controversial metaphysics of personhood or 
theory of individual or political psychology. 
Rawls's veil of ignorance is designed to deal with a 
specific question: What is the best conception of justice 
for a democratic society? It is a mistake to think that the 
same veil would be helpful for answering other ques-
tions. If one wants to investigate justice in the work-
place, or family, or environmental justice, one could 
construct an original position with a veil of ignorance 
suitable to these aims (just as Rawls designed another 
veil for the original position relevant to international 
justice), but the veil of ignorance that Rawls designed 
for the case of domestic justice should not be used for 
these questions. Again, in Rawlsian theory, the original 
position with its veil of ignorance and interests of the 
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parties are constructed from the particular question that 
it helps us answer-to use it for other questions is to 
misunderstand what it is and does. 
Other Veils 
By limiting the knowledge of the parties in the original 
position, the veil of ignorance expresses an ideal of 
impartiality. As such, it stands in a long tradition of 
similar notions and thought experiments such as Bishop 
Butler's court of conscience, Adam Smith's impartial 
spectator, David Hume's judicious spectator, and 
Immanuel Kant's standpoint of pure practical reason. 
The idea of taking an impartial perspective-and of 
limiting the first-personal preferences as a way of secur-
ing impartiality-has been perfected in utilitarian eth-
ics, where the moral point of view is one that counts the 
subjective well-being of all persons equally. Though 
neither used the same name as Rawls, John Harsanyi 
developed a utilitarian version of a veil of ignorance in 
the 1950s, and Friedrich August von Hayek used a simi-
lar device in his derivation of principles of justice in the 
Constitution of Liberty, published in 1960. Rawls did 
not invent the veil of ignorance; rather, he appropriated 
and adapted an available idea. 
A utilitarian veil of ignorance allows the parties 
complete information about their society, including the 
preferences of individual members of society, but 
deprives them of information about what position they 
occupy (or the position of those they represent). The 
result is that they choose principles that maximize aver-
age utility. Such a utilitarian veil of ignorance is thinner 
than the one employed by Rawls because it allows the 
parties more information. Other theories of justice 
might defend a thicker veil of ignorance than the one 
employed by Rawls. For example, if one believes that 
justice should not be influenced by general facts about 
human psychology, then the veil should shield the par-
ties from these facts ( Gerald A. Cohen and others who 
share his views on the nature of justice could go in this 
direction). Deliberate democrats might follow Jurgen 
Habermas and argue that debates about politics should 
take place with full information. 
These disagreements about the thickness of the veil 
of ignorance express underlying disagreements about 
the nature of justice-about what question we are using 
the veil of ignorance to answer and of the assumptions 
within the question. Utilitarians and socialists would not 
be persuaded by Rawls's original-position arguments, 
for they would reject his characterization of the veil of 
ignorance (and perhaps also of the interests of the par-
ties), but this simply shows that their assumptions about 
justice differ. Again, the veil of ignorance, and the origi-
nal position more generally, only work as arguments for 
the principles of justice as fairness for those who accept 
that Rawls has identified both the right question and the 
assumptions built into the question and that these are 
properly expressed by the original position. Different 
arguments are needed to show that the question, 
assumptions, and construction are as Rawls saw them. 
Perhaps disappointingly, the veil of ignorance in Rawl-
sian theory only works as an argument for those already 
committed to the basic assumptions of Rawlsian liberal-
ism, and it cannot serve as an independent argument 
against utilitarianism, socialism, or other theories of 
justice that do not accept these assumptions. 
Jeppe von Platz 
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